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MUSIC AS A TEMPORAL FORM*

MUSIC is a temporal art. The temporal aspect of music differentiates it from the visual arts of architecture, sculpture, and painting, and sets it in a certain relationship to drama, poetry, and the dance. Drama, poetry, and the dance are temporal arts inasmuch as they require time in order to be realized. In what way musical time differs from this kind of time and thus how music is a temporal art in an eminent sense form the subject to be explored briefly in this essay.

Time in the drama provides a framework for a series of actions and events which, as Aristotle says, have a beginning, a middle, and an end. But the beginning, the middle, and the end, that is, the structure here in question, is not temporal in the strict sense. It refers to a series of actions that take place *in* time. It is not time itself that begins, continues and ends in this case, but the actions for which time provides a framework. It is theoretically possible, although not artistically so, that the drama begin "earlier" than it actually does without radically changing the remaining structure. The beginning of a drama is not absolute in the sense that time itself begins. It is a beginning in time, chosen for its dramatic relevancy. The drama itself is by its very nature an intensified *extract* of the total time implied in the life of its characters. Similarly, the time of the drama can be interrupted. A scene ends, and the next scene begins the following day, a week or even two years later. This has no disturbing effect on the dramatic action. What is essential is not the concrete uninterrupted time in which the action takes place, but rather the directedness of the action itself. Thus time retains a certain extraneous quality; it is not completely integral, although it is necessary to the developing action.

These observations apply to a certain extent to poetry as well. But in poetry the visual element is reduced to a minimum, and the emphasis lies almost exclusively on language. Poetry need

* The author is deeply indebted to George Sherman Dickinson, whose completely original, philosophical way of looking at aesthetic problems prodded this paper into existence.

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not have the sentence structure of prose; nevertheless its structure does not rely solely on the sound of the words, but rather on a poetic juxtaposition of meanings and connotations. If poetry does not attempt to approximate music and rely extensively on the pure sound of the words, it is bound, although to a lesser degree than prose, to linguistic meaning, to concepts. And concepts are directly opposed to the temporal; they are timeless.

The inner relationship of the dance to music lies in its basic principle of movement. This common factor makes possible the intimate conjunction of the two arts. But the movement of the dance, and thus its "time," differs from that of music in that it is visible movement. Its structure is determined by the element of visualization, more specifically, by the possibilities of the human body.

What is the position of music in this situation? The distinction was made above between a structure in time and a temporal structure. Music is a temporal structure; it is not a structure in time. The clarification of this assertion is intimately bound up with the problem of form and content and of subject and object, perhaps the thorniest with which aesthetics has to deal.

But isn't the statement that music is not a structure in time a blatant offense against obvious facts? When one goes to a concert, there is certainly a time before and after the quartets that are being played; there is even an intermission between! The listener does not spring into existence with the first chord of the quartet as Minerva from Jupiter's head. And he doesn't vanish when the concert is over; he applauds. Consequently there is a time before and after the quartet, and the quartet is a structure in time.

But this is a confusion of two completely different things. If the word 'temporal' is understood in this sense, then a statue is also in time. When I study a statue from different angles, walking around it, this statue, more exactly my observation of it, is in time. In this vague sense everything is in time—a stone lying on the road, a statue, a quartet. This kind of time, however, is not generic to the stone or the statue or the quartet, or, for that matter, to anything at all. It is an ingrained, inexplicably stubborn habit of thinking.

This, then, is not the kind of time meant when we say that the drama is in time. The time of the drama is self-contained. It provides an artistic framework *in which* the dramatic action unfolds. We are familiar with this kind of time. It is time as we experience it in our own actions and thoughts, here dramatically heightened and intensified. Yet its structure remains that of "in time."

The functional difference of time in the two expressions: 'a structure in time' and 'a temporal structure' becomes more evident when we consider the simple linguistic constitution of these two expressions.

A structure in time: that is, a structure that constitutes itself in time. This time *precedes* the structure, it is already there providing a framework for what happens in it. 'In time' is an adverbial phrase answering to the question: *where?* It *locates,* as it were, the structure; it is fundamentally a "spatial" determination, if 'spatial' is understood here in the broad sense of a static, potentially completed frame of reference.

A temporal structure: that is, a structure that constitutes itself in a temporal manner. Time does not precede the structure, nor does it follow from it. It *is* the structure itself, the way in which the structure unfolds. The word 'temporal' is, formally considered, an adjective answering to the question: *what kind of* (structure)? But the functional meaning of the word 'temporal' has adverbial significance answering to the question: *how?* Through this functional meaning the noun 'structure' receives the verbal significance of a *process.* 'Structure' does not refer here to the scaffolding for a house which could be described as large, broad, or rusty. It refers to a forming *process.*

The problem of music as a temporal structure can be best approached by way of its relationship to the two fundamental dichotomies of (1) form-content and (2) subject-object.

The factor which is essential to musical time and which makes it impossible to subsume musical time exclusively under either side time is *heard* time. It is not perceived or measured with the aid of the visual sense, as is objective time. "Objective time" is intended here in the sense of time belonging to objects, more exactly to the motion of objects. This is the kind of time which belongs, for instance, to Aristotle's distinction of the different kinds of motion: quantitative motion (addition and subtraction), qualitative motion (alteration) and local motion (change of place). None of these categories of motion can be applied exactly to musical motion, since they are valid primarily for the motion of things. In musical motion, however, there is no thing involved which is moving. There is nothing material which increases or decreases, which changes into something else, or which changes its place. Aristotle did not equate time with the motion of material objects. He upheld, as nearly every philosopher has done in one way or another, a relationship of time to the numbering, measuring soul. His definition of time as the number of movement in respect of before and after seems at first to be applicable to musical time in

that the numbering soul establishes and retains the relationship of the earlier and the later. But that which the soul measures is for Aristotle, as for all Greek philosophy, primarily the movement of bodies and things.

After Augustine time came to be viewed more and more exclusively as a function of consciousness, until in modern philosophy it has become practically identified with consciousness itself. The question here is: can this time of consciousness be identified with musical time? The time of consciousness is not bound to outer objects; it is strictly an inner time, a kind of spontaneous flow of experiencing. What is moving here is nothing material or objective, but rather the act of awareness itself.

It is obvious that musical time lies nearer to subjective time than to objective time. It has several elements in common with subjective time. The complete phenomenon of music includes the act of being heard; it has an indisputable relationship to the subject. In order to be fully realized, music must *sound;* it must be played and heard. In this sounding, in the act of perceiving sound, lies musical time.

Is, then, musical time equivalent to subjective time? It is not. Subjective time, whether this be understood psychologically as the stream of consciousness of modern literature, or philosophically as the development of an *évolution créatrice* (Bergson) or as the form in which the reflecting ego constitutes its world (Husserl), remains divided in the dichotomy of form and content, in spite of the fact that it is precisely this dichotomy which it strives to overcome. Time is here the form in which thoughts, associations, images, and objects appear or are constituted.

Musical time is not the form for a content which is heterogeneous to it. The "content" of this time form is also temporal. What "flows" in the musical "form" are not concepts, images, or objects. These are atemporal contents. The fact that they *follow* one another changes nothing. It does not make them temporal, since each in itself is static. Only by being *in* time do they acquire a certain character of movement. In musical "form" what "flows" are tones, tone complexes, and patterns, and these are genuinely temporal in themselves.

In what sense is the "content" of musical form temporal? If "content" is understood here in the simple sense of what is contained in musical form, in analogy to the thoughts flowing in a stream of consciousness, of what is flowing, the content is made up of the tones themselves. Hanslick [1] distinguishes between con-

[1] Eduard Hanslick, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (Leipzig: Weigel, 1854; English edition, New York: Novello, 1891), chapter 7.

tent (what is contained) and object (what is represented). Music has a content, the tones, but no object (it represents nothing). Hanslick goes on to show that the distinction of form and content in music is untenable, since the opposition of an unformed material and an empty form does not hold true. Tones are the content, but they are already formed. Tones are the form, but they are already filled out. There is no such thing as an unformed, unorganized tone, and there is no such thing as an empty tone.

The really valid question with respect to music concerns not its content (which is inseparable from its form) nor its object (it has none), but rather its *meaning*. Certainly music has a meaning, but this meaning is not *conceptual*. Hanslick demonstrates this by saying that, if you want to make clear the content of a musical theme to someone, you have to play the theme for him. The fact that the meaning is nonconceptual does not amount to saying that it is a matter of vague individual emotions and feelings. Music has undoubtedly a relationship to emotion, but this emotion is nothing individual or specific. On the contrary, it is in its own way far more abstract than concepts, and yet it is totally *direct*. But to pursue this important question would lead us too far astray from the subject of this essay.

After this digression we shall return to the question of the "content" of musical form, using the word 'content', in spite of its unsuitability, a little longer for purposes of analysis. In what sense is the content of music temporal? 'Content' refers now to the tones. A tone is temporal in that it does not remain. When it has been sounded, it vanishes. That is a platitude, but it is a fact that determines the whole structure of musical thinking. From this simple fact comes the necessity that something *happen* to and with the tones. This can be applied to all dimensions of musical structure, beginning with the construction of a theme and progressing synthetically to include the architectonics of a symphonic structure. It is this inherently temporal character which generates rhythm. Hegel expresses this by saying that the material of music has no permanency in itself, its expression does not attain any lasting existence.[2] Because a single tone cannot persist by itself, because it fades away as soon as it sounds, there arises the necessity of sustaining the tone in some manner, and this can only be accomplished by "repeating" the tone. The repetition will probably not be a tone of the same pitch, but we can abstract from the element of pitch for the time being. The "repetition" is actually not a repetition in the usual meaning of the word at all, if one understands by this an exact duplication

[2] G. W. F. Hegel, *Ästhetik*, vol. 3, sec. 3.

of what has preceded. The very fact that a tone has sounded makes its repetition into a *renewal,* an organic intensification of what has preceded. Pure repetition is a mechanical category. The motion of a machine is repetitious. In music there can be no repetition in this sense. The repetition of a theme always has a character which is *qualified* by what has gone before (and, by anticipation, by what is to come). It can be qualified as an answer (as in terraced dynamics), or as a substratum for a changing context (chaconne), or as a culmination which includes by implication the entire development of a movement (recapitulation).

It is difficult to characterize this phenomenon of renewal accurately, since it lies at the bottom of all relationships, of the microcosmos and the macrocosmos, from tone to tone, from theme to theme, from division to division, and, in an extensively organized structure, from movement to movement. If its scope is enlarged of these dichotomies is a very simple one: the fact that musical to signify the essential principle that something happens *again,* it constitutes the foundation for all relations between structural units. It includes not just the "repetition" of a given unit, but also its antithesis, its complement, etc., in short every mode of related projection.[3] This principle is not subject to any mechanical determination, as is the repetitious movement of a machine. It creates itself each time anew out of the two concrete factors of (1) the internal subdivision of units (what *kind* of renewal they require), and (2) the internal intervals separating the renewals, the successive re-beginnings.

The temporal character of musical material requires a principle of renewal. This renewal does not happen at random. It is articulated in its inner matrix as rhythm. Rhythm is not a pure flowing extension, pure duration, but rather a pulse, a kind of punctuated force. In order to have rhythm, the "material" in question cannot be massively, continuously *present.* It must be such that it renews itself constantly.

We have examined briefly the temporal nature of the material of music, of tone. But this is not yet musical *time* as such. What about musical time? With this question we return to the distinction made above between a structure in time and a temporal structure. In the essential sense music is not "in time." It is of course in time in the banal sense that everything is in time, but this is irrelevant to the question. In order for music to be

[3] This relation is defined and analyzed in its various concrete forms by George Sherman Dickinson in "Analogical Relations in Musical Pattern," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* **17**, 1. We confine ourselves to its general temporal aspect.

in time, "time" would have to provide a framework, an enclosing form which would make music itself the content of this form, that which is *contained* in it. But music itself is essentially temporal, and time cannot be contained in time. Time cannot be contained in anything at all. Apart from the obvious objection of a regressus in infinitum, there is the more important objection that time does not *remain* in such a way that it could be contained in anything. This impossibility of music being in time applies equally to objective and to subjective or psychological time.

What about musical time? One of the fundamental definitions of time is that it is the principle of succession, as space is the principle of coexistence. But musical time is not just plain succession, it is not a homogeneous, quantitative time, the abstract idea of fleeting time units. There is no already extended time which belongs to musical structure, no extended time of which the actual succession has to be filled out in the way, for example, we say that we have to somehow "fill out" an afternoon.

The relationship of musical time to time in general can be compared to that of a musical theme to the theme of a work of nonmusical art. The "theme" of a play, a poem, or a novel, or a painting is a description of its total content, of what it represents. The theme of Othello is the tragic consequence of irrational jealousy which drives to destroy that which it wants to possess. The theme of a work of music, however, is not "what it is *about*"; it is what it *is*. The theme is the concrete stuff itself of the musical work.

The same can be said of time; it constitutes the concrete stuff of music. Time lies in the transient nature of a tone and also in its pitch. The inherent relatedness of different pitch levels (in tonal music) demands a movement that *realizes* this relatedness. A tonic and a dominant cannot remain as contrasts beside each other as can black and white. Their very relatedness requires a motion that actualizes this relationship and transcends the separateness of its members.

But if time constitutes the "stuff" of music, this is not yet musical time in its entirety. It is the forming and shaping of time that yields the complete phenomenon of musical time. Can time *be formed?* Time has always been considered a form in some sense of the word, a form in which something happens. For the Greeks this "form" was still conceived as being in unity with "nature" (nature in the sense of the cosmos), as, for instance, in the conception of time as the moving image of eternity (Plato). For Kant it becomes "transcendental"; that is, it is the *conditio sine qua non* of the possibility of experiencing objects. What is

experienced in time (and in space) is an object, and an object must be experienced in time, otherwise it cannot be experienced at all. It is not so important whether time is considered as belonging to nature or as being a structuredness of the mind. What is important is the characteristic of time as a form in which something happens. This form is in some sense "given"; it is already established in the sense that it has its own inexorable laws which are not accessible to any intervention.

We said, however, that in music time *is* formed. What happens to the conception of time as a form, when time itself is that which is formed? Is this the difference between time in general and musical time, that the former is a time form, the latter a formed time? What does that mean, formed time? If time is conceived as a kind of framework, a kind of all-embracing container in which events take place, how can this framework, which claims to be something more or less absolute, unassailable, and ultimate, itself be formed?

How can a form be formed? It cannot, if form is understood as a visible shape. The only way to form this kind of form would be to destroy it and create a new one. The "form" of music, however, is not a visible shape; it is nothing that is there all at once. It is not extended in space; it is not even extended in "time." The form is nowhere. The form *is* at no (particular instant of) time. What is there is a form*ing*, a process the activity of which is *present* only in the actual heard moment. Yet this actually heard moment is not an isolated fragment of time. It does not conform to the traditional conception of the present, of the "now" as a fleeting durationless instant bounded on both sides by nothingness, by the no longer of the past and the not yet of the future. In the moment of musical time lies the whole of musical time. But this "in," this manner of being contained cannot be interpreted in the physical sense. It is not analogous to the way in which pencils are in a drawer or frogs in a small boy's pocket. Nor can it be interpreted in a logical sense. The manner of being contained is not one of subsumption, as when an object can be subsumed under and contained in a more general concept. (An oak belongs to the general category *tree* and is contained in it.) The moment of musical time is not a general category which contains particular things capable of being subsumed under it. Is, then, perhaps the reverse of this the case? Is the moment of musical time the particular which somehow contains the whole? This would seem at first to come closer to the problem. But the whole of a musical work is nothing more *general* than, say, its main theme or motive. The categories of general-particular,

whole-parts belong to conceptual logic. Their application to musical logic is very questionable, although to a great extent unavoidable, since the only way to express musical analysis is in terms of language, of conceptual logic.

The whole of a work of music is nowhere except in the actual passage of this work. The whole is in each moment, never the "same," and yet always the whole. Its manner of being present is not that of a thing which is either there or not there, a clean-cut either-or. Since music is never present in the sense that an object is present, this clean-cut dichotomy is inapplicable. The fact that the whole of a piece of music is never "there," *extended,* is the condition of its being present in a nonextended sense. There is no *polyphony* in space. Space allows room for this or for that thing to fill it out, but not for both.[4] Two people cannot stand in exactly the same place (at the same time), a fact which becomes evident when one is standing in line for something.

Since the whole is never extended, it can and must be "contained" in each moment and in the passage from moment to moment. What is already past and what is to come, both are in the moment, not as objects remembered or anticipated, but as temporal functions *essentially qualifying* what is being heard. The ear cannot objectify as the eye does, and consequently its "synthesis" is of a different order. The ear has nothing in front of it; it cannot move from one thing to another and back again. Its synthesis is instantaneous and irreversible, a temporal synthesis.

What has been sketched out here with reference to the relationship of the whole and its parts applies equally to the relationship of form and content. The categories of form and content are also debatable when applied to music. This holds true even when one does not take into account the problem of the content of music in the sense of what it represents. The clear-cut opposition of form and content proves to be inadequate already at the level of a "formalistic" analysis of musical elements, not to speak of the more difficult and complex problem of its meaning. Time ceases to be a form in which something happens when the "content" of this form is not separable from the form itself. When the content itself is "time," time becomes the "happening" itself. It is not that *in which* something happens, but rather the very process of this happening.

Yet there remain certain differential temporal factors in a musical work which cannot be leveled down and dispensed with under the general label 'time'. There is a sense of something

[4] Cf. Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles.

flowing and a sense of a systematization,[5] a unifying of this flowing. All this is "time," but it is not one general melting-pot into which all differentiations can be pseudo-scientifically thrown.

What quality of time itself permits this differentiation, so that time can be *both* that which flows and that which bounds this flow? And what is the nature of this differentiation, what happens to time when it becomes thus differentiated?

We shall treat the second question first. What happens to time is that it becomes *aesthetic* time. It is not objective time, nor is it subjective or psychological time. Kant divided human activity into the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic. Speaking in terms of this division,[6] aesthetic time is not related to cognition nor to actions of the will, but to judgment as a higher faculty of feeling. An aesthetic[7] object is related primarily to the experiencing subject, whose experience in this case is not directed toward theoretically ascertaining the actual existence and nature of the object, nor toward putting it to any practical use. The aesthetic sphere has to do with the beautiful (and the sublime) which Kant defines as: that which, universally and necessarily without a concept, arouses disinterested satisfaction by its mere form.[8] What the aesthetic object is (represents), its actual existence, its agreeableness (an individual matter relating to the senses alone), its purpose, nature, and concept, are irrelevant to aesthetic judgment. What is important is its subjective form alone, the manner in which the subject experiences it; and this manner is not arbitrary, but universal and necessary, characteristics otherwise valid only for concepts.

How does this affect the idea of aesthetic time? The first and most striking factor in aesthetic time is that time is experienced in a different way. It is not *conceived* of as a kind of flowing; it is actually *perceived,* it is *heard,* it is in the strict, literal sense *aesthetic.* This cannot be said of any other kind of time. In this sense aesthetic time is unique. The result is that time loses certain characteristics that belong exclusively to time as a concept. Time loses the "negative" quality of transiency, since the idea of a flowing time that draws along everything in it becomes untenable. The opposition of passing time and the objects, situations,

[5] From the Greek σύστημα (*systema*), literally standing-together.

[6] Kant never considered time itself in terms of this division, rather treating time solely in terms of the theoretical sphere as a pure, that is, as an a priori *given* form of intuition. The fact that time is a given form of receptivity, never of spontaneity, excludes it *eo ipso* in the constitutive sense from the practical and aesthetic spheres.

[7] From αἴσθησις (*aesthesis*), perception.

[8] *Critique of Judgment,* Book 1.

events in time striving against it to maintain a certain stability becomes meaningless. Time becomes absolved from the claims of existence (duration, preservation) and use. It is no longer opposed as transiency to the striving of something to remain as it is (existence, duration) or to become what it ought to be (usefulness, teleology). The aesthetic sphere is, according to Kant, indifferent to the existence and usefulness of its object. In music this absolution from the demands of existence and usefulness finds expression in the fact that music is *played.* Play is the quintessence of free activity. It has no purpose, and it has nothing to do with factual existence. This does not mean, however, that it is meaningless or that it is arbitrary, i.e., lacking its own inner laws.

When time becomes aesthetic time, it loses the quality of transiency belonging to time as a concept. And when the quality of transiency is lacking, the *movement* of time becomes a different kind of movement. This is the second factor contained in the aesthetic sphere. Kant emphasizes two factors in aesthetic judgment: its character as feeling with a sensuous substratum (as opposed to sheer rationalization) and its character as judgment (as opposed to sheer sensualization). We touched upon the first factor: that aesthetic time is perceived, is heard. The second relates to judgment: to the kind of logic of aesthetic time. And since time is not static, but rather dynamic, its logic must refer to the kind of movement in question. An investigation of this movement will lead back to the first question: what quality of time permits its differentiation into that which flows and that which bounds this flow?

The problem of the movement of time is a very difficult one. The "solutions" of this problem are so various that they go so far as to stand in direct contradiction with one another. Perhaps the most common idea of the movement of time is that it flows out of the future through the present and into the past. This movement corresponds to the conception of time as the principle of transiency. Everything disappears along with, more exactly on account of, this movement of time into the past, and becomes lost, irretrievable.

Another directly opposed idea of the movement of time is that which conceives time as a kind of function of organic growth. Here time moves from the past into the future. The past is the germ of growth which develops and evolves toward the future. The movement is not so much that of transiency as that of a gradual completion culminating in fulfillment. It is a development of possibilities, not a loss of actualities.

How does musical time move? The first temptation is to answer that it moves into the future. But what is this "future"

into which it moves; "where" does it lie? Here we are again faced with the problem that musical time cannot be "in time." Musical time does not have an objective, abstract, "nonmusical" future and past as its orientation. It sets up, so to speak, its own future and past, and it does this *constantly in the process of its own motion.* It does not do this once and for all; just when would be extremely difficult to determine. This is the very essence of musical motion: the constant creation of a future and a past in the actual present moment, in *each* present moment. Even this moment is not present in the strict sense; it is not there in front of the listener in the manner of an object. The moment of musical time is not present, it is at best present*ing,* creating the temporal tension of what has gone before and what is to come, the tension of the whole in the moment. Thus the essential character of musical time is not a kind of vague neutral flowing at all. It is a tension peculiar to music itself. The Greek ῥεω (*rheo*) from which the word 'rhythm' comes does not mean to flow, but to hold in bounds.[9] It is impossible to think of rhythm as an uninhibited, unbounded flowing. This is evident in every kind of rhythm, for instance, in breathing or in a heartbeat. In rhythm lies the unity of bounding and flowing. This unity is an *original* one. There is not first a flowing which is then subsequently bounded. The flowing flows as bounded flowing. Without the inner bounds it could not "flow" in a rhythmical way, it could not constitute itself as a temporal tensity. It is this element of temporal tensity which gives music its own singular kind of "substance." Without this a piece of music would be "over" as soon as it began. It would, so to speak, slip by immediately without having *been.* Tensity is its manner of being there.

To summarize briefly the temporal nature of the two basic constituents of music, tone and rhythm: tone and rhythm are both temporally tensive. The expression '*temporally* tensive' means that they cannot remain in a state of static tension, as, for example, in a state of polarization. They strive to *realize* this tensity. They do not remain in it, nor do they obliterate it; they actualize it.

Tone: The etymology of the word tone reflects the Greek conception of a tone (τόνος, *tonos,* tension, stretching) produced by the lyre. The tension inherent in the production of a single tone is, however, not yet musical tensity. Otherwise the height of tensity would lie in a shrill whistle, a sound neither aesthetic nor

[9] Cf. Wilibald Gurlitt, "Form in der Musik als Zeitgestaltung," *Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur zu Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse,* **1954**, 13.

tensive, only nerve-shattering. Musical tensity lies in the relation of the tones, in the peculiar continuity of transition between them, a sort of tensity between tensions. This continuity is not extended, it cannot be localized. It lies somehow quasi between the tones, and yet it is musically more basic than the isolated tones themselves.

Rhythm: J. J. Rousseau defines rhythm as follows:

> C'est, dans la définition la plus générale, la proportion qu'ont entr'elles les les parties d'un même tout. C'est, en musique, la différence du mouvement qui résulte de la vitesse ou de la lenteur, de la longueur ou de la briéveté des temps.[10]

Generally speaking, rhythm is understood here as the proportion between the parts of a single whole. Musically speaking, this proportion becomes a difference in movement.

The principle of rhythm could perhaps be defined as the constitution of a schematic differentiation based on constant interruption.

A perfectly uniform gliding movement is not rhythmical, nor is a constant humming noise. There is no interruption. The ticking of a clock is not rhythmical either. Here there is interruption, but no differentiation into units proportional to one another and bound by a controlling center (accent). There is no possibility of coincidence with or deviation from an ideally established norm. Thus, in a more comprehensive sense of the word, there is not really interruption at all. This is analagous to a perfectly uniform motion which is in its own way a state of rest. There is no change.

The time that bounds music is not outside music itself, enclosing it as a container holds its contents. Music cannot be "in time" when its essence is to have the future and the past, which otherwise constitute the framework of this "in time," in the moving moment. Since music cannot be in time, the time that bounds it is something wholly unique. It bounds from the inside, from and in the very core. It is inside the flowing, conditioning and constituting that flowing itself. The whole of time, which is usually thought of as forming a static outer framework, is *in* the moment, but neither the whole nor this moment is a *finished, completed* entity. Thus the *relation* of the two is not static; it cannot remain as a kind of coincidentia oppositorum. The "opposites" here in question do not belong to the same dimension and are therefore, strictly speaking, not opposites at all. A tensive relation can be static only if both poles exactly equalize, neutralize each

[10] *Dictionnaire de Musique* (Paris: Duchesne, 1768).

other. The relation here, however, is a tension between two different dimensions. It never reaches a resolution that exhausts its components as a mathematical equation does. It is, in a sense, striving to realize the impossible. Herein lies the basic priority of tensity in music. The whole is *in* the moment, but does not *coincide* with it. What is "left over," the discrepancy, defies "resolution." Tensity is not simply a by-product of opposing forces; it is not a surface disturbance of a fundamental equilibrium. Musical tensity is never mathematically resolved, it is never *totally* resolved at all, but works itself out aesthetically in the musical process. This working itself out does not have as its goal an equative resolution that cancels out the preceding process ($xy = xy$). Tensity must necessarily find a resolution, but this resolution does not cancel it out.

This tensive relation generates the temporal factor in progression, the whole moving in the moment which drives towards explicating, detensifying this whole within it. This is temporal tensity. Tensity strives towards ultimate detensity, thus producing extensity (*not extension*).[11] It is paradoxically the very temporal, i.e., transient, instantaneous nature of music that generates its own peculiar kind of ex-tent, not extension, not even duration, but literally the working (stretching) out of tensity. Resolution as the goal of this tensity is secondary. Its prime function and meaning lie in creating the unique and incomparable mode of musical substance.

To return to the first question: what quality of time permits this differentiation into that which flows and that which bounds the flow? To ask this question is to ask: how can time become musical time? Musical time is also "time." It is not as if there were first time, and then music, in some inexplicable way superimposed on it. It must be that time becomes *transformed* into musical time. But what kind of time is it that becomes transformed? Objective time? Psychological time? The time involved in the motion of objects? The time of consciousness? Time related to cognition? to action? Which time? Whose time, if time is always together with some kind of measuring faculty?

Perhaps the answer to this assault of questions lies in the direction that there is no such thing as a general, abstract time in itself which must first be "transformed" into aesthetic time. This is not tantamount to saying that time is "relative." Nor

[11] For the central conception of tensity, its polarization intensity-detensity and its resultant extensity I am indebted to George Sherman Dickinson's manuscript (unpublished) of *Synopsis of Style in Music.*

does it mean that all time is aesthetic time. Perhaps the phenomenon of aesthetic time lies nearer to what time is than the idea of a general abstract time that is inexorably "there" waiting to be filled out or to roll on into the past taking all its contents with it. Perhaps there is no need to transform time into aesthetic time, because time itself is a transforming process. Perhaps this transforming [12] becomes manifest, becomes concrete and perceptible in aesthetic time in an eminent way not found in any other art or human activity.

The "negative" quality of time, its transiency, is lacking in aesthetic time. Time is experienced *aesthetically,* i.e., as being beautiful or meaningful. This fact does not lend itself to the interpretation that the aesthetic realm is a kind of flight from "reality," a sort of embellishing glossing over (a connotation which the word 'aesthetic' often wrongly has) of the hard facts of existence. It far more raises the question whether the aesthetic cannot throw light on reality in a way that other activities cannot.

The fundamental characteristics of time as such are: (1) instantaneousness, (2) irreversibility, and (3) differentiation into the modes of past, present, and future. Time may have other characteristics, depending on how it is defined and interpreted, but without these three basic factors it ceases to be time, and one is talking about something else. These factors are all interrelated. Differentiation into the modes of past, present, and future is inextricably bound up with irreversibility, and irreversibility is in its turn related to instantaneousness as the impossibility of an extended continuum in which the direction can be reversed.

A fourth characteristic, indispensable to the idea of time *as* aesthetic time, actually to the idea of time *as* any *kind* of time and thus also to time itself, is that of neutrality. The fact that there are different kinds of time (objective, psychological, aesthetic) that are not derivative from each other implies a certain neutrality (*not* relativity) of time itself. This characteristic makes aesthetic time possible, but it does not belong to an analysis of aesthetic time. Neutrality refers to the possibility of different structures, not to the concrete constitution of a structure.

A point of departure for the problem of the relation of time as such to aesthetic time was touched upon in the discussion of "repetition," of renewal. The phenomenon of renewal and its structurally propelling force, tensity, do not just conform to the three fundamental characteristics of time: they exemplify them;

[12] *Trans-form* in the double meaning that form is created and at the same time transcended.

they coincide with them; they *are* these characteristics. The "again" of this renewal includes in itself instantaneousness and irreversibility, and constitutes the differentiation of the time modes. The "again" is irreversible; it cannot be thought of as lying in the past. This would dissolve every possibility of orientation. Even a crab canon has to move forward. The "again" occurs instantaneously. It is not caught in the insistent net of duration. If it were, it could never come again; it could only persist, impotently fading away into a monotonous extinction.

Musical "repetition" does not constitute itself as the same thing occurring at a different time. The repetition contains in itself what has happened in the elapsed intervals; it brings the time interval generically into the repetition itself.

Thus time becomes freed from the imposed dualism of bounding and flowing, of container and contents. It becomes freed from the encumbrance of extraneous contents inhibiting it, becomes purely concrete, its unique tensity unobscured by structures foreign to it.

In conclusion we shall attempt to give a tentative definition of musical time: Musical time is time manifesting itself in such a way that it transcends the dichotomy of a thing manifesting itself temporarily in something else, absorbing this dichotomy into the evolving, structuralizing tensity of aesthetic temporality.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The House, the City, and the Judge: The Growth of Moral Awareness in the Oresteia. RICHARD KUHNS. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962. xi, 164 p. $5.00.

The literature on tragedy is vast, and the most stimulating and influential reflections have been contributed by philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Other philosophers who have written on the subject without equaling the impact of those four include Hume and Schopenhauer, Scheler and Jaspers. But in the English-speaking world, tragedy has been largely left to the classical philologists (who are often very good indeed on points of detail) and to literary critics (who are often quite bad in their unsupportable generalizations). Professor Kuhns takes up the cudgels for philosophy.

His book can be divided into two parts: the first four chapters (not quite 100 pages) deal with "the plot and the hero" of the

Oresteia, with its "moral issue," and with "law, rule, and the polis." Here the author contributes little: much of what he has to say is stated more briefly by Philip Vellacott in his short introduction to the Penguin edition (Kuhns quotes Vellacott's translation once but does not refer to his introduction); and Gilbert Murray's masterly little book on *Aeschylus,*[1] which is not listed in the seven-page bibliography of secondary literature, is head and shoulders above Kuhn's account of Aeschylus's thought. The second part of Kuhns's book consists of the final chapter (44 pages), entitled: "Dramatic and Moral Meaning of Catharsis." This is more interesting philosophically.

The major points of the first part include the following. "The world of Olympian revolution is midway between the established order of the older gods and the enlightened *politeia* of Athens" (29). "The Erinyes, Apollo, and Athena are each representative of stages in this evolution" (67). "The conclusion of the *Oresteia* in fact states the conditions for the triumph of civilization over barbarism" (79). Occasional footnotes remind us, e.g., on page 67, that these contentions are not new or original; but the author does not seem to realize that he is laboring the obvious.

There is one point that is not obvious: that Apollo's apparently odd argument in defense of Orestes, to the effect that "the mother is no parent of that which is called her child, but only nurse of the new-planted seed that grows" (*Eumenides,* 658 ff.), is not a mere sophism but a theory widely believed in ancient Greece. But even this was pointed out before by other writers whom Kuhns duly quotes.

The long chapter on catharsis cites many studies of this much-debated concept and tries to bring some order into the chaos by suggesting that "The interpretations of catharsis are of four kinds." The first is based on the medical analogy and associated with Bernays, Bywater, and Butcher. The second maintains that the emotions are not purged but purified: they are "purged of their egocentric reference" (107). L. A. Post and E. P. Papanoutsos are classified in this category.

The third interpretation holds that catharsis "takes place essentially in the tragedy when it is composed, not in the soul of the spectator; . . . it has nothing to do with a cure or treatment of him. . . . Pity and fear . . . are purified in the same moment that they are aroused, by their incorporation into the beauty and measure of the perfect whole" (112). These lines are quoted from an early article by G. F. Else, who has importantly modified his view of catharsis in his book on *Aristotle's Poetics* (1957); but

[1] Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940; Oxford Paperbacks, 1962.

to the book Kuhns devotes a mere five lines which can hardly make much sense to anyone who has not read Else himself.

The fourth interpretation "maintains that catharsis is a redemptive process" (113). It is the hero who is purified through suffering and who attains to increased understanding. The spectator participates in this catharsis by participating in the hero's experience.

This fourfold classification of conceptions of catharsis is interesting and helpful and probably the best thing in the book.

Criticism is most conveniently offered under two headings. First, objections that have something to do with Aristotle or Plato. Secondly, those that pertain to the treatment of Aeschylus and Greek tragedy.

At the end of the survey of the four interpretations, we are told summarily that "each of these positions . . . can be buttressed by passages from the writings of Plato and Aristotle, [but] it is clear that no one of them satisfactorily explains the dramatic situation and offers an acceptable interpretation of catharsis. Which one is closest to Aristotle's original meaning it is impossible to say." Suppose the point about Aristotle were true; one would still like to see it supported by some evidence. But the famous passage from the *Poetics* that started the whole controversy is not even quoted. Much more important: it remains quite unclear what Kuhns means by "an acceptable interpretation of catharsis." What criteria would an interpretation have to fulfill to be rated acceptable? Or, to put the point differently: as long as the question is what Aristotle meant, the problem is clear; but once the question becomes what catharsis means, quite apart from "Aristotle's original meaning," one no longer knows what Kuhns is talking about. He himself shows that the term is ambiguous and has been used in different ways by different men of intelligence and discernment, but he goes on to write as if it were a profitable question what it really means.

This confusion enters into Kuhns's claim that making "of catharsis a knowing or cognitive process" has the "advantage of allowing one to say that ideally at least the tragic drama could reveal truths about the human condition and the self" (110 f.). Surely, we can say what Kuhns wants to say without saying anything at all about catharsis. Indeed, we can omit the hedge words "ideally at least" and "could" and say that it is a commonplace that Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides confront us with "truths about the human condition and the self." Kuhns seems to assume that the point of tragery is catharsis, whatever that means. He never considers the possibility that the point of

tragedy in general, if it makes any sense to speak of that, or for that matter the point of particular great tragedies, might consist in something that it would be better not to call catharsis—or at least in something that we should do well to distinguish from Aristotle's concept.

Another illustration of the same shortcoming: "As the *Poetics* makes clear, the plot is by far the most important part of the drama" (101). This is what Aristotle says rather baldly; but does he make out a compelling case? If Kuhns agrees with him, he might have met objections and defended the view. And he might also have attended more to the differences between Plato and Aristotle (pp. 134–35 are not nearly sufficient): instead he quotes a passage from Aristotle that some interpreters take for a polemic against Plato, without apparently noting this fact;[2] and he also ignores the very plausible suggestion that the whole theory of catharsis represents an attempt to answer Plato's critique of tragedy.[3] Indeed, Plato's critique is not discussed at all, although it is one of the aims of the book to clarify Plato's philosophy of literature.

To conclude the criticisms that pertain to Aristotle, Kuhns is surely mistaken when he tells us three times on the last five pages that "Aristotle's definition of tragedy" excludes works that end on a note of reconciliation. It is true that Aristotle preferred a tragic end, other things being equal (*Poetics* 13);[4] but he consistently refrained from projecting his preference into his definition (*Poetics* 6, 7, and 11).

Now as we turn to the treatment of Aeschylus, the most obvious fault of the book consists in two omissions: Aeschylus's other four extant plays are not considered at all, and up to the fifth page from the end neither Sophocles nor Euripides is mentioned. Even then Euripides is referred to in a perfunctory manner, and of Sophocles' plays only the two Oedipus plays are mentioned. Yet on page 132 there is a cryptic reference to "The playwrights and philosophers who concern us." More important: what is the subject matter of the long discussion of the "Dramatic and Moral

[2] Page 102, *Poetics* 1462. Cf. *Laws* 658d and, e.g. *Aristotle: On Poetry and Style*, tr. and introd. by G. M. A. Grube (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958), p. xii.

[3] Compare, e.g., F. L. Lucas, *Tragedy: Serious Drama in Relation to Aristotle's Poetics* (1927; rev. ed., New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 51 f., and John Jones, *On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy* (New York: Oxford, 1962), pp. 39 f.

[4] Jones (*op. cit.*, p. 47) doubts even this: after noting that 1453^{a}9 is contradicted by 1454^{a}4, he says: "I believe the second text (which prefers an averted disaster) to represent Aristotle's settled and general opinion."

Meaning of Catharsis''? If it is not Aristotle's original meaning but rather what as a matter of fact does happen in Greek tragedy, then one surely has to discuss some Greek tragedies.

Moreover, if one wants to know what Aeschylus believed or wished to teach—and this is one of Kuhns's central concerns—it would seem indispensable to have a look at all of his extant plays, and to contrast his treatment of the Orestes story with Sophocles' and Euripides' very pointedly different versions. But the reader is never even told that these two poets dealt with the same story, or that Homer refers to the story a number of times, or how Aeschylus transformed the plot sketched in the Odyssey. But if ''the plot is by far the most important part of the drama,'' it is doubly important to see where Aeschylus was original in constructing his plot, and where two of the greatest minds of his own century chose to differ with him.

The lack of historical perspective is a defect in other ways, too. A philosopher devoting a whole book to the *Oresteia* might have noticed its important place in the development of Greek philosophy. An apparently unimportant formulation sums up this failure: ''It seems to be the case that Aeschylus agrees with Plato and Aristotle . . .'' (130). If anything, they agreed with him: to put it my own way, Aeschylus stands half-way between Homer and Plato, and Euripides half-way between Aeschylus and Plato. Plato owes as much to them as he does to Parmenides and Heraclitus. They laid the foundations of the Platonic dialogue by discussing moral problems of the utmost seriousness in dialogue form. To treat Aeschylus, Plato, and Aristotle as if they had been contemporaries does not make sense, and the philosophers' discussions of tragedy should be evaluated against the background of the three great tragic poets who preceded them. On ever so many points, what matters is not whether the poets agreed with the philosophers, but whether the philosophers' dicta about tragedy agree with the facts—in other words, with the tragedies actually written by the three greatest tragic poets.

Finally, two points about the *Oresteia*. The author claims that Aeschylus assumed that ''the gods exist and are just'' (86),[5] that Aeschylus was ''concerned with the truth about the gods'' and ''concerned to present . . . the beliefs about the gods which are true'' (94). Without further explanation and qualification, this is plainly false; so much so that one wonders what could be meant. Surely, Aeschylus did not believe that Hermes really said what he

[5] This paragraph is not entirely unambiguous, but the two passages on p. 94 suggest that this is what he means. In the last chapter stylistic lapses abound and often leave one in doubt about the meaning.

is made to say in the *Eumenides* or in *Prometheus* (a discussion of the latter play would be interesting in this connection) or that he is telling us "the truth" about Apollo.

Kuhns also claims that what Orestes "did was certainly wrong" (141). I should argue that, according to Aeschylus, Orestes did the right thing, considering that in those days there were no courts. But the fact that a man's duty in ancient times could involve such horrors led to the development of institutions, at least in Athens, that abolished the necessity for such terrible deeds—and that is the occasion for the hymns of joy on which the trilogy closes.

Aeschylus, unlike Sophocles, believed that the use of reason and the establishment of wise institutions could eliminate tragedy. That not only is the point of the *Oresteia* but fits Gilbert Murray's persuasive reconstruction of the *Prometheus* trilogy and, most obviously, the striking way in which the king in *The Suppliants* resolves a tragic and apparently ineluctable dilemma by presenting it to the assembly of free men where the arguments pro and con are weighed and a vote is taken. But Aeschylus's world view is one thing, what makes his plays towering tragedies in spite of his apparently untragic world view is another, and generalizations about tragedy on the basis of the *Oresteia* are very likely to be wrong. Kuhns's on pages 132, center, and 134, bottom, are cases in point. And, the conclusion of the book, spelled out in the final five pages, can be supported only by ignoring almost the whole corpus of extant Greek tragedies; and even then it makes little sense of Orestes and Oedipus, the only two figures mentioned by Kuhns.

Greek tragedy and some of Aristotle's theories about it constitute extremely interesting subjects for philosophic reflection. Much of what Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and Nietzsche have said about tragedy is as misleading as it is fascinating, and important work remains to be done in this area. Professor Kuhns's approach, however, is clearly infelicitous; and apart from a number of specific shortcomings this is due in large measure to his almost exclusive concentration on a single work, *The Oresteia.* While Aristotle based some generalizations on *Oedipus Tyrannus,* and Hegel on *Antigone,* both made a point of drawing, though not systematically enough, on the whole corpus of tragedies known to them. A detailed interpretation of a single play or trilogy, on the other hand, is bound to be of slight philosophic interest: it cannot even hope to establish the playwright's philosophy, much less a philosophy of tragedy or a philosophy of literature, or an interesting theory of catharsis.

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Friedrich Nietzsches Werke des Zusammenbruchs. Erich F. Podach. Heidelberg: Wolfgang Rothe, 1961. 432 p., with 29 plates. DM 18.50.

E. F. Podach, who was the first to shed light on the circumstances surrounding Nietzsche's collapse in Turin in January 1889, by publishing the case history of the philosopher under the title *Nietzsches Zusammenbruch* in 1930 (American edition entitled "The Madness of Nietzsche" 1931), returns here with the amazing story of the most brazen literary fraud committed in recent times.

He has carefully studied the original manuscripts of Nietzsche's four last works written and prepared during the last months preceding outbreak of the thinker's madness. They are: "Nietzsche contra Wagner," "Der Antichrist," "Ecce homo," and the "Dionysos-Dithyramben." These manuscripts are now kept at the Goethe-Schiller-Archiv in Weimar, and Podach has spent considerable time studying every single one of them, for the first time with the eye of an unbiased scholar and philologist. Before the death of Madame Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche (which occurred in 1935), the philosopher's sister and director of the Nietzsche-Archiv had made such a regular inquiry impossible. For she wanted to force upon the world her own rather pedestrian and teutonic-conformist Nietzsche image which permitted first the German imperialists and then the Nazis to claim the thinker as their shield-bearer.

But, as Podach has shown, that tremendously overrated lady, who, in her primitive way, meant to exalt the work of her famed brother, was by no means the only one to help to bring about the great imposture. Her somewhat naive fraud was aided and abetted by a shamefully large group of "admirers" and learned men who knowingly perpetuated and even increased the Nietzsche myth, evidently for the sake of their own aggrandizement and politico-professorial fortunes. The first intellectual to tamper with the "Ecce homo" manuscript was Nietzsche's good friend Peter Gast, the musician (Heinrich Köselitz by birth). He acceded to Elisabeth's wish to smooth up the most shocking parts of the original. When "editing" the book, he omitted whole paragraphs. Among these omissions there are vitriolic personal attacks not only against Bernhard Förster, the detested antisemitic husband of Elisabeth but also against Nietzsche's friends Overbeck and Köselitz himself. He calls the latter "a weak Saxon, sometimes very clumsy, not easily to be moved from his place, a personification of the law of inertia—but his music is first-class and runs on 'light legs'."

The well-known theologian Overbeck is dubbed by Nietzsche "dried-out, a sourpuss, hen-pecked, offers me like (Wagner's) Mime the poisoned potion of doubt and distrust against myself—but he benevolently cares about me and calls himself my 'indulgent friend'!" Nietzsche ends this tirade with the following: "Look at them, —these are three German types! Canailles!"

It is understandable that Peter Gast chose to skip the invectives against persons still alive, including the rather unfriendly remarks about himself; but why in his very "generous" editing did he omit sentences like this: "The accursed German antisemitism, the venomous ulcer of the névrose nationale, has interfered, in that decisive period when not only my own fate but also that of mankind was at stake, with my life almost destructively; I owe to this element the fact that my *Zarathustra* has entered the world as *indecent* (N.'s italics) literature;—its publisher was an Antisemite." The same holds true for an "intermezzo" from "Nietzsche contra Wagner" which was unceremoniously skipped in the "official" version of "Ecce homo."

Though Nietzsche was still able to prepare the manuscript of "Nietzsche contra Wagner" for the publisher, the *Archiv* editors felt compelled to take out the well-known poem "Von der Armuth des Reichsten" ("On the Poverty of the Wealthiest") which was thought to form the last section of the book. In all "official" editions it is to be found only in *Zarathustra* (and also as part of the "Dionysos-Dithyramben"). It is fascinating but rather disturbing to see that the famous concept, The Will to Power, which was long considered a mainstay of Nietzsche's philosophy has never existed as a title of a full-grown book—for the simple reason that such a work, as it was submitted in 1906 by Madame Foerster and Peter Gast to the public, actually was a rough outline on a half-torn sheet later to be abandoned by the philosopher. At the very end, the planned work omitted that title completely, and the outline looked like this:

> *Umwerthung aller Werthe.*
> Erstes Buch. *Der Antichrist.* Versuch einer Kritik des Christentums.
> Zweites Buch. *Der freie Geist.* Kritik der Philosophie als einer nihilistischen Bewegung.
> Drittes Buch. *Der Immoralist.* Kritik der—verhängnisvollsten Art . . . von Unwissenheit, der Moral.
> Viertes Buch. *Dionysos.* Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkunft.

Even this last version was slightly changed in the fall of 1888. The "Antichrist," then, is nothing but a small and frequently re-

vised section of a larger book that never was written. Similarly, a volume of poems called "Dionysos-Dithyramben" is an arbitrary compilation of poems found posthumously.

Podach, in the appendix to this book, tells the tragicomic story of a doubtful plan for a new *Gesamtausgabe* of Nietzsche's works under the Nazi régime in which numerous noted scholars, who now attack Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche and Nazism, were willing to participate *ad majorem Hitlerii gloriam*. Fortunately, the project did not materialize. Podach concludes his findings with the pertinent remark: "Nietzsche is the most brazenly falsified figure of recent literary and cultural history with regard both to his life and to his works."

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Schopenhauer. PATRICK GARDINER. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963. 312 p. $1.65.

One might have any of a variety of reasons for writing a book on some great philosopher. It might be an impassioned desire to render his philosophy more intelligible and convincing to unappreciative readers, to provide new interpretations of its more obscure aspects, to criticize it from the standpoint of opposed doctrines or, simply, to write a book about something or other that is presumed to have fairly widespread interest. It is not clear that the present book has any more definite motivation than this last. There are Pelican books on other great philosophers; why not one on Schopenhauer too?

The book is a comprehensive summary of Schopenhauer's philosophical ideas, expounded pretty much in the order that Schopenhauer developed them. They are expressed almost entirely in Gardiner's clear but rather prolix prose, with not many quotations, and with fairly lengthy criticisms. An excellent biography neglects to note the philosopher's love for animals and his sense of kinship with them. Indeed, Schopenhauer is said to have always lived alone, with no mention of his beloved and faithful dog. His metaphysics and its Kantian background is discussed at length, but one really does not get from this the overwhelming importance of Schopenhauer's voluntarism. It is almost as if the doctrine of the will as the ultimate reality were something strange and arbitrary—the less said of it the better. Some reasons for this central doctrine are given, but very little is said of its explanatory value in Schopenhauer's famous speculations on sexual

and parental love, the anatomy of animals, animal instinct, evolution, religion, and so on. Perhaps Gardiner, like so many others, does not consider these things philosophically significant. Schopenhauer's pessimism is likewise soft-pedaled. No chapter is given to it, and it is alluded to more or less incidentally. In the discussion of Schopenhauer's ethics almost nothing is said of compassion or malice, which Schopenhauer considered the chief moral and anti-moral incentives. Egoism is given the role of the prime anti-moral incentive, though Schopenhauer distinguished this quite clearly from pure malice.

The general impression one derives from Gardiner's book is that he considers philosophy to consist of a variety of questions, the answers to which are more or less known to clear-headed, well-educated, and articulate men, and that he considers Schopenhauer to have tried, with moderate success, to straighten out some confusions and shed a little light on some of these questions in the manner that contemporary philosophers do so smoothly and well. Schopenhauer's answers to this question and that are set down, and then some of the various alternative answers set forth, always tentatively, and prefaced by such expressions as "it could be argued," "a critic might be inclined to object," "it might be questioned," and so on. The reader thus gets the impression that Schopenhauer perhaps had things straight part of the time, was a bit mixed up at other times, and that one might just as well take his pick which answers to accept or reject, in case he has any interest in accepting or rejecting any.

The book does not, therefore, seem to me to express the uniqueness, profundity, human importance and, indeed, the radiant truth of Schopenhauer's thought, but this is perhaps largely due to my own almost religious devotion to this man's philosophy. It is certainly a good book, and serves well to outline Schopenhauer's philosophy for modern students. Recent books on Schopenhauer are very few, the only other English one known to me being Father Copleston's wholly inadequate and superficial discussion. Those who love Schopenhauer's writings can rejoice that a book of this quality, by a writer of the most evident philosophical acumen, has been written to help fill what is nearly a void. It is only regrettable that one gets the impression, both from Ayer's editorial foreword and from one of Gardiner's sections, that it is a good reason for writing a book about Schopenhauer that Wittgenstein is alleged to have read him.

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Dimensions of Freedom: An Analysis. FELIX E. OPPENHEIM. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961. 242 p. $6.50.

Professor Oppenheim's book aims at being a contribution to the foundations of political science, as it is seen in one modern view, that of Lasswell and Kaplan. In this view political science is a purely empirical discipline which attempts to discover laws and to formulate theories which will describe and explain political behavior. One problem faced by this enterprise—as by any scientific enterprise in the early stages of its development—is that of formulating a clear, precise, and unambiguous terminology. The key terms in the vocabulary must be operationally defined, directly or indirectly. One such term in the vocabulary of political science is "freedom." Hence Oppenheim's book.

The difficulties that beset his effort are magnified by the fact that the term "freedom" has a long history of diverse use, popular and technical. The explication of this term in Professor Oppenheim's program requires that he steer a very careful course between the shoals of popular usage on the one side and those of arbitrary stipulation on the other. Stipulation is necessary to some extent to achieve clarity and precision, but conformity to usage is necessary to maintain contact with the subject matter and for intelligibility. Aware of the difficulties (121), Oppenheim appears to have avoided them. The freedom he is discussing is a freedom with which political thinkers have been concerned, and his introduction of the technical machinery of modern logic (in a very restrained manner) does help to clarify certain aspects of its meaning. In these respects, I think the analysis is careful, precise, accurate, and successful.

One might wish, however, to question the Oppenheim's aims. Is what he is attempting feasible in the long run? If feasible, is it worth while? Is it the sort of step that political philosophy ought to be taking? After some brief account of the procedures and conclusions of *Dimensions of Freedom,* a few remarks on these broader questions will be in order.

Among the possible meanings of the term "freedom" as used in ordinary speech and in the technical and polemical literature of politics, Professor Oppenheim selects as the one which he will analyze what he designates as "social freedom." The formal pattern for statements about freedom in this sense is: "With respect to one actor, another actor is free to act in a certain way." To explicate the meaning of this expression in operational terms, we learn that it is first necessary to define "control" which is

defined in terms of "influence" and "restraint," which in turn are defined in terms of "cause," "choose," "attempt," and "do," all of which are considered as relational terms. The definition that emerges, or rather the system of definitions that emerges, is said to be operational in the broad sense since the terms involved express properties or relations that may be directly observed or that may be inferred from empirical data.

Controlling is a causal relation, and that form of controlling which involves restraining creates unfreedom. "With respect to Y, X is unfree to do *x*, to the extent that Y makes it either impossible or punishable for X to do *x*" (81). (Preventing and punishing are forms of restraint.) Unfreedom turns out to be the basic concept in Oppenheim's analysis, both because it explicates what people are usually striving for when they say they are striving for freedom, viz., the elimination of unfreedom, and because in terms of unfreedom we can understand what freedom means.

The interpretation of "freedom" in terms of "unfreedom" is not simple and direct; e.g., we cannot say "freedom is the absence of unfreedom." Unfreedom can be expressed in reference to one act—"X is unfree to travel to China"—but freedom's expression requires reference to at least two possibilities of action—"X is free to travel to China or Russia" or "X is free to travel to China or stay at home." Unfreedom means prevention or punishment of an action; freedom requires choice between actions. Thus, making a desired action mandatory is as much a limitation of freedom as prohibiting it.

A further point emphasized by Oppenheim, one that gets to the root of what he means by *social* freedom, is that freedom, and for that matter unfreedom, exists in relation to another individual (or group). Recognizing this enables us to eliminate some of the apparent paradoxes regarding freedom; e.g., one may be free and unfree, free in relation to one individual but unfree in relation to another.

If one asks why this particular sense of "freedom" is selected to serve as the basis for political science, Oppenheim has an answer.

> . . . I do not propose to enrich by a further definition the array of interpretations of freedom which fill the history of political thought. My aim is, rather, to give an adequate interpretation of freedom in one of its meanings —social freedom. This is not an arbitrary choice. I do believe that those who speak of freedom in a political context refer most often—but often unknowingly—to freedom as a relation between actors. I am also convinced that this is the most fruitful way in which the notion of freedom can function in scientific discourse (109).

Frequency of usage and suitability for empirical political science are the reasons given. But are they adequate? Remarks about current and historical usage in another place (110–111) raise some doubt about the first reason. Fruitfulness in scientific discourse raises another problem, one that takes us to the aims of the study as a whole.

This analysis is another step in the movement that aims to separate political science from its source, the political perplexities of men and citizens in their search for justice in society, and to graft it onto another tradition, that of scientists in their search for ever more adequate descriptions of what is happening in the world. The separation of the descriptive from the normative elements in political discourse was an earlier step, a prerequisite to this step which attempts to give coherence to the descriptive elements that remain. The meaning of freedom as social freedom was selected for analysis chiefly because it lends itself to this sort of analysis, it fits in with the program. This criticism seems to be borne out by Chapter 7 ("Some Other Meanings of Freedom"). The other meanings of freedom are divided into descriptive and valuational meanings. The former are rejected either because they do not lend themselves to the kind of analysis that the program contemplates or because they tend to merge into valuational meanings. The latter are rejected because their acceptance would require that the sharp distinction between fact and value on which the program rests be abandoned.

That Oppenheim has done what he set out to do, and that he has done it clearly and coherently, may be granted. That what he set out to do is what needs to be done may and should be questioned.

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